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SUMMARY
From February 1998 to March 1999,
fighting between ethnic Albanian guerillas and
Yugoslav troops killed over 2,500 ethnic
Albanian civilians and the displacement of over
400,000 people.  After Yugoslavia rejected a
Western-sponsored peace plan for Kosovo put
forward during peace talks at Rambouillet,
France in February-March 1999, NATO began
air strikes against Yugoslavia on March 24.
The Serbs launched an intensified ethnic
cleansing campaign that resulted in thousands
of additional deaths and the displacement of
hundreds of thousands more.  After 78 days of
NATO bombing, Yugoslavia agreed on June 3
to withdraw its Yugoslav forces from Kosovo
and the deployment of an international peace-
keeping force.  Under the terms of U.N. Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo is
governed  by a U.N. civil administration until
elections are held for an autonomous local
government. After the autonomous govern-
ment is in place, Kosovo’s long-term status
will be considered. Almost all ethnic Albanians
want independence for Kosovo; Serbs say it
should remain within Yugoslavia.  
A NATO-led peacekeeping force (dubbed
KFOR), is charged with providing a secure
environment for the implementation of UNSC
Res. 1244.  After KFOR deployed to Kosovo,
most ethnic Serbs left the province. KFOR has
been faced with continuing violence against
ethnic Serbs by ethnic Albanians, as well as a
ethnic Albanian guerrilla insurgency operating
from Kosovo against the Presevo valley in
southern Serbia, a region with a large ethnic
Albanian population. Kosovo held its first free
and fair municipal elections on October 28,
2000. The Democratic League of Kosovo
(LDK), led by moderate Ibrahim Rugova
handily defeated its leading competitor, the
Democratic Party of Kosovo, led by ex-Koso-
vo Liberation Army commander Hashim
Thaci. Almost all ethnic Serbs in Kosovo
boycotted the vote. The United Nations is
likely to schedule elections for a Kosovo-wide
government for the first half of 2001. 
Since the beginning of the conflict in
Kosovo, the Administration condemned Ser-
bian human rights abuses in Kosovo and called
for autonomy for Kosovo, while opposing
independence.  The Administration pushed for
air strikes against Yugoslavia in March 1999.
It  rejected the use of ground troops to eject
Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, but favored the
deployment of U.S. peacekeepers in Kosovo if
a peace agreement were reached. U.S. officials
have emphasized that Europe should provide
most of the resources for peacekeeping and
reconstruction effort.  
In 1999, the 106th Congress debated
approval of Operation Allied Force.  Congress
neither explicitly approved nor blocked the air
strikes, but appropriated funds for the air
campaign and the U.S. peacekeeping deploy-
ment in Kosovo. In 2000, several Members
unsuccessfully attempted to condition the U.S.
military deployment in Kosovo on congressio-
nal approval and on the implementation of aid
pledges made by European countries.  In 1999
and 2000, Congress provided funding for
reconstruction in Kosovo, but limited aid to




Kosovo At a Glance
Area: 10,849 sq. km., or slightly smaller than
Connecticut
Population: 1.956 million (1991 Yugoslav census)
Ethnic Composition: 82.2% Albanian; 9.9% 
Serbian.  Smaller groups include Muslims, Roma,




On January 15, 2001, Hans Haekkerup, former Defense Minister of Denmark, replaces
Bernard Kouchner as head of the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).  In a New Year’s
address, Kouchner warned that continuing violence by Kosovar Albanians against
minorities, primarily Serbs, imperiled the future of the province.
In a statement after President-elect Bush announced his nomination as  Secretary of
State on December 16, Colin Powell  said that the new Administration would undertake an
immediate  review of the U.S. military deployment to Kosovo, as well as other deployments
throughout the world to “make sure those deployments are proper. Our armed forces are
stretched rather thin, and there is a limit to how many of these deployments we can sustain.”
He stressed that the United States would consult with its allies during the review.  He
underlined that the United States was not “cutting and running,” but was looking for a “way
of substituting others or substituting other kinds of organizations and units and perhaps
police organizations to handle the remaining missions.”
  
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
War in Kosovo: February 1998-June 1999
From February 1998 until March
1999, conflict between the ethnic
Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army and
Serb forces (as well as Serb attacks on
ethnic Albanian civilians) drove over
400,000 people from their homes,
according to the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees.  More than
2,500 ethnic Albanian died,  according
to the Committee for the Protection of
Human Rights and Freedoms, an ethnic
Albanian human rights group.  In early
March 1999, the Serbian Media Center
in Kosovo said that 115 Serbian policemen died in the conflict in 1998. It said that ethnic
Albanian guerillas killed 284 civilians in 1998, both Serb and non-Serb supporters of the
government.   (For historical background to the conflict in Kosovo and a brief suggested
reading list, see CRS Report RS20213, Kosovo: Historical Background to the Current
Conflict.)  
Faced with the possibility of a humanitarian disaster during the winter if fighting did not
stop, NATO’s North Atlantic Council issued on October 12, 1998 an “activation order” for
NATO forces to conduct air strikes on Serb forces in Kosovo and elsewhere.  The strikes
were averted when, on the same day, Yugoslav President Milosevic made a series of
commitments to U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke, including a cease-fire, a reduction of troop
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levels in Kosovo, the stationing of an OSCE “verification mission” of up to 2,000 unarmed
persons and a NATO aerial verification mission.  
The agreement began to fray soon after it went into effect.  The increasing deterioration
of the situation on the ground, punctuated by the January 15 Serb massacre of ethnic Albanian
civilians at the Kosovar village of Racak, led the international Contact Group (United States,
Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) to agree on January 29, 1999 on a draft peace
plan for Kosovo.  They invited the two sides to Rambouillet, near  Paris, to start peace talks
based on the plan on February 6.  As an inducement to the parties to comply, on January 30
the North Atlantic Council agreed to authorize NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana to
launch NATO air strikes against targets in Serbia, after consulting with NATO members, if
the Serb side did not agree to attend the Rambouillet talks.  In an effort to press the KLA to
the negotiating table, NATO said it was also studying efforts to curb the flow of arms to the
rebels.  The draft peace plan called for 3-year interim settlement that would provide greater
autonomy for Kosovo within Yugoslavia, and the deployment of a  NATO-led international
military force to help implement the agreement. (The text of the plan can be found at
[http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html].)  On March 18, the
ethnic Albanian delegation to the peace talks signed the plan, but the Yugoslav delegation
rejected it.
NATO began air strikes on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999.
Yugoslav forces moved rapidly to expel most of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians from their homes,
many of which were looted and burned.   A December 1999 State Department report
estimated the total number of refugees and displaced persons at over 1.5 million, over 90%
of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian population. The report says that Yugoslav forces killed about
10,000 ethnic Albanians, and tortured and raped others. After 78 days of increasingly intense
air strikes that inflicted damage on Yugoslavia’s infrastructure and its armed forces,  President
Milosevic agreed on June 3 to a peace plan brought to Belgrade by EU representative and
Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari and Russian Balkans envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin. The plan
was based on NATO demands and a proposal from the Group of Eight countries (the United
States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Russia and Japan). It called for the
withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo; the deployment of an international
peacekeeping force with NATO at its core; and international administration of Kosovo until
elected interim institutions are set up, under which Kosovo will enjoy wide-ranging autonomy
within Serbia.  Negotiations would be opened on Kosovo’s final status.
On June 9, NATO and Yugoslav military officers reached agreement on a Military
Technical Agreement governing the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. The
withdrawal began the next day, and NATO suspended its air strikes.  On June 10, the U.N.
Security Council approved UNSC Resolution 1244, based on the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin
plan and the G-8 principles. KFOR began to enter Kosovo on June 11.  The Yugoslav pullout
was completed on schedule on June 20. On June 20, the KLA and NATO signed a document
on the demilitarization of the KLA.  (For chronologies of the conflict in Kosovo, see Kosovo
Conflict Chronology: January-August 1998, CRS Report 98-752 F; Kosovo Conflict
Chronology: September, 1998—March, 1999, CRS Report RL30127; and the daily Kosovo
Situation Reports collections for April (CRS Report RL30137), May (CRS Report
RL30156), and June (CRS Report RL30191), 1999.)
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Current Situation in Kosovo
Within weeks of the pullout of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and the deployment of
NATO-led peacekeeping force KFOR in June 1999, the overwhelming majority of ethnic
Albanian refugees returned to their homes.  At the same time, over 210,000 ethnic Serbs and
other  minorities living in Kosovo left the province, according to a May 2000 estimate by the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. International officials estimate the number of Serbs
living in Kosovo at around 100,000.  Many of the Serbs remaining in the province live in
northern Kosovo in or near the town of Mitrovica.  The rest are scattered in isolated enclaves
in other parts of the province, protected by KFOR troops.  A key reason for the departures
is violence and intimidation by ethnic Albanians.  Since the pullout of Yugoslav forces, over
one thousand ethnic Serbs and Roma  have been kidnaped or killed, and hundreds of houses
of Serb refugees have been looted and burned.  A June 2000 report by U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan to the Security Council stated that attacks against ethnic Serbs “appeared
to be orchestrated.”   
Political Situation
An important question for Kosovo’s future is what role will be played by former KLA
fighters.  The Kosovo peace settlement, as laid out in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244,
calls for the demilitarization of the KLA. On June 20, 1999, KLA leader Hashim Thaci signed
a demilitarization document that had been worked out with KFOR. The KLA was
demilitarized on September 20, 1999, and formally ceased to exist.  On the same day, KFOR,
U.N. officials, and the KLA signed an agreement on the formation of a Kosovo Protection
Corps (KPC).  The mission of the KPC is to assist in reconstruction efforts, search and rescue
operations, and cope with civil emergencies.  It has 5,000 men in uniform, including two
thousand reservists.  Although it is supposed to be multi-ethnic, apolitical and non-military,
many observers say a key political purpose of the force is to defuse possible resistance to the
KLA’s demilitarization by providing ex-KLA fighters and commanders with jobs and a quasi-
military structure.  While U.N. and KFOR officials stress the civilian nature of the KPF, KPF
leaders continue to view the KPF as a way to preserve the KLA as a de facto army.
International officials believe large amounts of undeclared weapons remain in the hands of ex-
KLA troops (as well as others), and that some ex-KLA troops and leaders have formed armed
groups and/or criminal gangs.  In 2000, KFOR troops uncovered large weapons caches and
training bases in the Drenica region, the cradle of the KLA.
In early 2000, ethnic Albanian guerillas, many of whom are ex-KLA fighters, began to
step up attacks on Serbian police units in the Presevo valley inside Serbia, near Kosovo’s
eastern border.  The population of the area, encompassing the towns of Medveda, Bujanovac
and Presevo, is about 80% ethnic Albanian.  The guerillas, who reportedly number in the
hundreds, seek to join the region to Kosovo.  In the past, Serbian police forces have engaged
in intimidation of ethnic Albanians in the area, burning homes and arresting young men.
Concerned that the guerrilla attacks and the Serb response could trigger a conflict that could
pull in KFOR, Western leaders have warned ethnic Albanian leaders in Kosovo that they
would lose international support if the guerilla group continued its activities.  
In late November 2000, several hundred ethnic Albanian guerrillas operating from a 3
mile-wide demilitarized buffer zone in southern Serbia stepped up attacks against Serbian
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police in the region, killing four policemen.  Angered by the attacks, the new Yugoslav
government of President Vojislav Kostunica has pressed KFOR to stop guerrilla penetration
from Kosovo into the demilitarized zone, or reduce or eliminate the zone so that more heavily
armed Serbian police and Yugoslav army can drive out the guerrillas themselves.  In response,
NATO promised to step up efforts to halt the infiltration of men and supplies from Kosovo
and  increase cooperation with the Serbian police. However, NATO rejected any modification
of the buffer zone, which was established to separate Yugoslav forces from KFOR when
KFOR was deployed to the province in June 1999.  KFOR officers are concerned that
permitting Yugoslav forces to operate in the zone could put KFOR soldiers, including U.S.
forces, at greater risk.  On December 17, U.S. forces exchanged fire with guerrillas as the
U.S. forces were blowing up a road used by the guerrillas to transport weapons into the zone.
No injuries were reported. On December 30, KFOR brokered a verbal agreement between
the two sides aimed at lifting reducing tensions and improving freedom of movement for
civilians in the area.  
Since June 1999, Kosovo has been ruled by the U.N. Mission in Kosovo, headed by
Bernard Kouchner.  In  January 2000, a new  Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS)
was established to increase local participation in the government.  It includes an Interim
Administrative Council (comprising three Kosovo Albanian leaders, one Kosovo Serb leader,
and four UNMIK members), and 19 administrative departments, each of which is also
supposed to have representatives of local groups. Kouchner retains legislative and executive
authority in Kosovo but shares provisional administrative management of the province with
this structure. As its name implies, the interim administration is a transitional step toward a
fully-fledged Kosovo government to be chosen in elections that may be held in spring 2001.
          
On October 28, 2000, Kosovo held OSCE-supervised municipal elections.  Most of the
parties running in the election differed little from each other on ideological grounds, and are
based more on personal loyalties and clan and regional affiliations.  The biggest of several
parties to be formed from the ex-KLA is the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), headed by
Thaci. The other  major political force in the province is Democratic League of Kosova
(LDK), headed by Ibrahim Rugova.  The LDK was by far the ethnic Albanian largest party
before the war, but it began to lose ground after what some ethnic Albanians viewed as a
passive stance during the war.  However, the behavior of some ex-KLA leaders since the war,
including seizure of property of ethnic Albanians, the levying of “taxes,” and harassment and
violence against ethnic Albanian political opponents, appears to have resulted in an
improvement in the “more civilized” LDK’s standing. 
The LDK won 58% of the vote province-wide, the PDK only 27.3%. The LDK won the
majority in 21 municipalities, with the PDK winning six.   In the remaining three Serbian-
majority municipalities so few people voted that the OSCE did not certify the results. 
Turnout for the vote was 79%.  U.N. officials hailed the election’s success and recommended
that Kosovo-wide elections be held in the first half of 2001. However, it is possible that ex-
KLA leaders who seized property after the war may react violently if the new local authorities
want it back, or want to tax or regulate its use. Both before and after the vote, several ethnic
Albanians leaders and officials were killed or injured.  Many of those killed or injured have
been from the LDK, and some analysts charge that Thaci’s party or other ex-KLA parties




Kosovo Serbs are divided on how to best defend the interests of their community.  Anti-
Milosevic Serbs have formed a Serbian National Council in the town of Gracanica in central
Kosovo.   Serbs in the town of Mitrovica, in northern Kosovo near the border with Serbia,
have formed their own group.  Both groups charge that UNMIK and KFOR have been
ineffective in protecting them from ethnic Albanian violence.  They claim the establishment
of the Kosovo Protection Force and now the joint administration are stepping-stones to an
independent Kosovo, which they oppose.  However, the Gracanica group, much the smaller
of the two factions,  views cooperation with the international community as the only way to
secure the interests of Serbs in Kosovo.  Nearly all ethnic Serbs in Kosovo boycotted the
October 2000 municipal elections. Turnout was virtually non-existent in the areas in which
they are the majority.  Nevertheless, UNMIK will appoint Serbs to local government bodies
in order to make sure Serbs have some representation in them. Most ethnic Serb leaders say
that this is unacceptable, and have demanded their own elections in areas in which they are
a majority.  
Milosevic’s fall from power in early October 2000 and the election of Yugoslav
president Vojislav Kostunica may have an important impact on the situation in Kosovo.
Kostunica strongly opposes Kosovo’s independence and has called for strict implementation
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, which calls for Kosovo’s autonomy within
Yugoslavia.  Western officials acknowledge that Kostunica’s nationalism will make him
difficult to deal with on Kosovo, but say that his respect for the rule of law will make him far
less likely to try to use Serbia’s military and security services to undermine UNMIK and
KFOR by covert action, as they charge Milosevic had done.  Kosovar Albanian leaders
acknowledge that the political demise of the man chiefly responsible for atrocities against
them is a positive development, but have viewed the West’s rush to support Kostunica with
concern.  This is partly because many feel that the Serbian atrocities were solely the product
of one man, but of deeply-rooted Serbian nationalism.  They are also concerned that
Kostunica’s victory could give the Serbs an upper hand in international discussions of
Kosovo’s future.  They say that the Serbs have an internationally-recognized defender of their
interests, while the Kosovars do not.  This situation may lead the Kosovars to push more
strongly for an accelerated schedule for Kosovo-wide elections in 2001 and the handover of
power to elected Kosovar leaders.  
The emergence of the new post-Milosevic regime in Serbia and of elected leaders in
Kosovo may eventually open the way to talks between the two sides, although at present they
appear far apart on many key issues, including the future status of Kosovo.  An important
issue of immediate concern is the status of over 729 ethnic Albanian prisoners in Serbian jails
and of over 3,500 other missing Albanians.  The post-Milosevic regime says that it is willing
to make progress on releasing ethnic Albanians from Serb jails, but wants to clarify the status
of hundreds of Kosovo Serbs that have been kidnaped and are missing. 
International Response
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999) forms the basis of the
international role in Kosovo.  It authorized the deployment of an international security
presence in Kosovo, led by NATO, under a mission to ensure that Yugoslav forces are
withdrawn from Kosovo; that the cease-fire is maintained; and that the KLA is demilitarized.
The Kosovo Force (KFOR) is charged with “establishing a secure environment” for the return
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of refugees, the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the operation of the international civilian
administration.  The resolution says KFOR is to oversee the return of “hundreds, not
thousands” of Yugoslav troops to Kosovo to liaise with the international presence, mark
minefields, provide a “presence” at Serb historical monuments and “key border crossings.”
To date, no Yugoslav Army troops have returned to Kosovo. 
  U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 gives the U.N. mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
the chief role in administering Kosovo on a provisional basis until new elections for interim
autonomous institutions are held. These duties include administration of the province;
maintaining law and order, including setting up an international police force and creating local
police forces; supporting humanitarian aid efforts; returning refugees to their homes;
protecting human rights; supporting the reconstruction effort; preparing the way for elections;
and facilitating talks on Kosovo’s final status.   The resolution provides for an interim period
of autonomy for Kosovo for an undefined length of time, until negotiations on the final status
of the province take place. It expresses support for the FRY’s territorial integrity.  U.N.
officials have said that the goal is to achieve peaceful coexistence among the province’s ethnic
groups, rather than an integrated, multi-ethnic society.  In October 2000, an independent
commission recommended to the U.N. that Kosovo be granted “conditional independence”
status.
Bernard Kouchner, formerly France’s Health Minister, served as Special Representative
to oversee UNMIK until January 2001.  His replacement is Hans Haekkerup, Danish Defense
Minister, who takes office on January 15, 2001.  Jock Covey of the United States is Principal
Deputy Special Representative.  Initially four deputies have served under them, responsible
for the pillars of civil administration, humanitarian aid, democratic institution-building, and
reconstruction.  The U.N. has led the first two pillars, while the OSCE is in charge of
institution-building, and the European Union leads the reconstruction effort. The humanitarian
aid pillar was phased out in mid-2000.  In a June 2000 review of UNMIK’s first year, U.N.
Secretary-General Annan reported to the Security Council numerous improvements in
Kosovo, but condemned the upsurge in localized violence against minorities, especially Serbs
and Roma, in Kosovo. The authorization for UNMIK automatically continues unless the
Security Council decides otherwise.
 
KFOR
According to NATO sources, on June 28, 2000 KFOR had 38,550 troops in Kosovo.
The United States had 5,600 troops in the province.  The U.S. controls one of five KFOR
sectors in Kosovo. Other leading contributors are Italy (4,750), Germany (4,200) France
(4,550) and Britain (3,200). Each has its own sector in Kosovo. Other participating countries
serve under commanders from these countries. The U.S. sector contains troops from Russia,
Poland, Greece, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates and Lithuania. Russia has about 3,300
troops in KFOR, but does not have its own sector.  KFOR’s overall command is held by
Italian Gen. Carlo Cabigiosu.  The U.S. sector is commanded by  Brig. Gen. Dennis Hardy.
 KFOR’s mission, in accordance with UNSC 1244, is to monitor, verify, and enforce the
provisions of the Military Technical Agreement and the KLA demilitarization agreement.
KFOR is also charged with establishing and maintaining a secure environment in Kosovo,
including maintaining public safety and order until UNMIK can take over this responsibility
more fully.  KFOR has also provided support to UNMIK and non-government organizations
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for reconstruction and humanitarian projects.  KFOR has successfully overseen the pullout
of Yugoslav troops from Kosovo and the implementation of the KLA demilitarization
agreement. However, KFOR has not been entirely successful in maintaining order in Kosovo,
including  in stopping attacks against Serbs and other minorities.  KFOR troops, including
U.S. soldiers, have been fired on or assaulted in numerous  incidents.  Scores of KFOR
soldiers have been injured and two Russian KFOR peacekeepers have been shot and killed.
One U.S. soldier has died as result of possible hostile action, when his vehicle struck a mine.
 A long-standing complaint of U.S. officials (as well as of UNMIK chief Kouchner and other
officials) is the failure of European countries to fulfill their commitments to supply enough
police for Kosovo, which has saddled KFOR with the lion’s sharing of the policing duties.
KFOR has deployed a 320-man paramilitary police unit consisting of Italian and Estonian
troops  to assist in policing tasks. 
U.S., Russian and other KFOR peacekeepers have detained dozens of men and seized
substantial quantities of weaponry in an attempt to stop ethnic Albanian guerrillas from
moving men and supplies into 3 mile-wide demilitarized buffer zone in southern Serbia, which
has served as a staging area for attacks against Serbian police in the Presevo valley region.
However, these efforts have not been entirely successful so far. However, KFOR has rejected
any modification of the buffer zone, which was established to separate Yugoslav forces from
KFOR when KFOR was deployed to the province in June 1999.   (For more on the NATO
and U.S. military role in the Kosovo crisis, see CRS Issue Brief IB10027, Kosovo: U.S. and
Allied Military Operations. For more on KFOR, see KFOR’s website at
[http://www.kforonline.com]. 
Civil Administration
The international civil administration component of UNMIK comprises three offices: a
police commissioner, a civil affairs office, and a judicial affairs office.  Tom Koenigs of
Germany is Deputy Special Representative in charge of this pillar. In July 1999, Special
Representative Kouchner issued a regulation on the legislative and executive authority of
UNMIK.  Subsequent regulations have, among other things, established a new customs
service, legalized the use of foreign currencies while designating the Deutsche Mark the
commonly used currency in Kosovo, established small-scale lending services, and outlined the
self-government of the municipalities after the local elections. UNMIK oversees
administration of public funds in Kosovo, including payments of salaries and pensions.  (For
more on UNMIK’s activities, see UNMIK’s web site at 
[http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo1.htm])
In mid-July 1999, Special Representative Kouchner chaired the first meeting of the
Kosovo Transitional Council (KTC), a broadly representative consultative body under
UNMIK that includes ethnic Serb representatives.  The Transitional Council meets on a
weekly basis, and includes 34 members.  On December 15, 1999, Kouchner signed an
accord with three leading Albanian representatives on establishing a new Joint Interim
Administrative Structure (JIAS).  The structure includes an Interim Administrative
Council and 19 administrative departments.  The Council is supposed to comprise three
Albanian members, one Serb, and four UNMIK representatives. A Serb member joined the
council for the first time on April 11, 2000.  The interim administrative council is co-
chaired by UNMIK Deputy Representative Covey and a rotating co-President, and meets
about twice a week.  Several administrative department heads have been named.  In
IB98041 01-10-01
CRS-8
response to the violent situation in Mitrovica in February2000, the Council approved a
plan to redeploy 300 UNMIK police and to appoint international judges to strengthen the
judicial system.  In March, UNMIK established “confidence zones” in Mitrovica to serve
as a buffer between the divided parts of the city. After the October 2000 municipal
elections, UNMIK has assisted with the establishment of the provisional  municipal
assemblies.  UNMIK has made attempts to appoint Kosovo Serb and other minorities to
the municipal assemblies.
A key component of civil administration is the establishment of law and order in the
province.  To this end, international and local civil police forces have been created and
new judicial bodies established.  Under its original mandate, the UNMIK police force
comprised a civilian unit, or regular police (1,800), a special police unit for crowd control
(1,150), and an international border unit (205).  In October 1999, U.N. Secretary-General
Annan proposed a 1,600 increase in the force, bringing the total authorized size to 4,718. 
UNMIK officials have frequently complained about the very slow deployment of civil
police from member states.  By December 2000, 4,400 international police personnel from
53 countries had been deployed to Kosovo, about 90% of the authorized total.   The
United States provides the largest police contingent with nearly 600 personnel. 
Christopher Albiston of Britain took over as commissioner of the international police force
in January 2001.  UN police officers mainly conduct patrols jointly with KFOR; the
UNMIK civilian police is supposed to eventually take over policing duties from KFOR. 
UN police have assumed full policing authority in the Pristina and Prizren regions.  In the
divided city of Mitrovica, UNMIK police have supported KFOR’s search for illegal
weapons.  The UNMIK police also work with the new Kosovo Police Service (KPS)
comprised of local recruits (see section on institution-building, below).  It is envisaged that
the KPS will eventually take over law and order functions from UNMIK.  In addition,
UNMIK has recruited over 4,600 Kosovars for the newly-formed civilian Kosovo
Protection Corps, intended for emergency and humanitarian situations rather than for
providing law and order.  Its maximum strength is 5,000.
In June 1999, the U.N. Representative swore in a multi-ethnic panel of nine judges
(five Albanians, three Serbs, and one Turk).  The judicial panel operates under a modified
version of Yugoslavia’s criminal code.  By October 2000, 405 judges and prosecutors had
been appointed by UNMIK, mostly ethnic Albanian.  13 international judges and
prosecutors have also been appointed.  In October 2000, the OSCE issued a report that
reviewed the criminal justice system in Kosovo.  It assessed that the system fell short of
international standards, in spite of recent improvement.  A Kosovo Supreme Court was
inaugurated on December 14, 2000.
Institution-Building
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), headed by
Deputy Special Representative Daan Everts (Netherlands) leads international institution-
building efforts in Kosovo.  The task of institution-building is comprised of four
components: training in justice, police, and public administration (in cooperation with the
Council of Europe); human rights monitoring (in cooperation with the U.N. High
Commissioner on Human Rights); democratization and governance; and, organizing and
supervising elections.  Over 2,400 international and local OSCE staff comprise the mission
in twenty-one field offices. 
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Recruitment for the training academy of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) has been a
priority for the mission.  In August 1999, the KPS police academy opened in Vucitrn. 
Several training sessions for recruits have been completed.  Most of the recruits have been
ethnic Albanian (many of whom were formerly members of the KLA), with about 17%
from minority communities.  Thus far about 2,850 cadets have been trained for the KPS,
which is eventually to comprise about 4,000 officers. 
Civil and voter registration, in preparation for municipal elections on October 28,
2000, began on April 28 and was completed on July 17.  About 1 million voters
registered.  However, Kosovo’s Serb and Turk communities largely boycotted the
process.  28 political parties and organizations and 5,500 candidates registered to run in
30 municipalities.  Nearly 80% of eligible voters participated in the largely peaceful vote. 
Results in 27 municipalities certified by the OSCE on November 7 showed the LDK
winning decisively with 58% of the vote.  UN officials hailed the election’s success and
recommended that Kosovo-wide elections be held in the first half of 2001.
A Media Advisory Board comprised of Albanian and Serb experts was created in
August 1999.  The OSCE established Radio Television Kosovo (RTK) as an independent
public broadcaster.  In response to Albanian media attacks on individual Serbs, UNMIK
temporarily shut down one newspaper and, in June 2000, devised a code of conduct for
the print media. With regard to human rights, OSCE personnel regularly monitor the
human rights situation throughout the province.  Human rights reviews have condemned
the continuation of ethnic violence against non-Albanian minorities in Kosovo. In June
2000, a joint OSCE/UNHCR report cited lack of security and limited freedom of
movement to be prohibiting factors for minority communities. In July, UNMIK established
an office of the ombudsman for Kosovo to investigate complaints about abuses of power.
(For more on the OSCE mission in Kosovo, see [http://www.osce.org/kosovo].)  
Humanitarian Aid and Refugee Returns
The humanitarian affairs pillar of UNMIK was phased out in July 2000, as the
international community’s focus shifted from humanitarian to development assistance.  A
humanitarian coordinator appointed by UNHCR continues to oversee international
humanitarian aid programs.  Humanitarian aid during UNMIK’s first year focused on
providing shelter assistance, aid to refugee communities, and de-mining activities.
Since June 1999, over 880,000 ethnic Albanian refugees have returned to Kosovo. 
An estimated 25,000 Albanian, Serb, and Roma refugees remain in neighboring countries
and several thousand more remain in more remote countries.  In early 2000, host countries
began to force or encourage the voluntary return of Kosovar refugees.  Since January
2000, about 12,000 Kosovar refugees have been forcibly returned to Kosovo from
western Europe.  About 80,000 Kosovar refugees from western Europe have returned
voluntarily.  UNMIK has appealed to western governments to halt forcible returns during
the winter months.  UNMIK has also appealed for the release of Kosovar Albanians in
Serbian prisons, especially after Milosevic’s fall from power.  By January 2001, about 700




As ethnic Albanian refugees have returned, large numbers of ethnic Serbs and Roma
(Gypsies) living in Kosovo have left the province for Serbia and Montenegro. In spite of
appeals by international, Yugoslav, as well as some Kosovar officials for the local Serb
population to remain in Kosovo, the outflow has grown.  UNHCR estimates that 180,000
Serbs and Roma from Kosovo have moved into Serbia and Montenegro; of these, an
estimated 130,000 arrived from Kosovo since the end of the NATO air strikes in June
1999.  Up to 100,000 Serbs still reside in Kosovo. A Joint Committee on Returns for
Kosovo Serbs was established in May 2000 to facilitate the return of Serbs to Kosovo. 
Violence in the Presevo region in southern Serbia in November 2000 has led more than
4,000 ethnic Albanians to flee into Kosovo.
At the July 28, 2000, donors’ conference in Brussels (see below), participating
countries pledged more than $2 billion in humanitarian and reconstruction aid to Kosovo. 
Of this amount, about $245 million was designated for emergency humanitarian needs.
The U.S. government has provided a total of over $533 million in humanitarian aid in
response to the Kosovo crisis since March 1998.
Reconstruction
  A High Level Steering Group oversees the reconstruction effort in Kosovo.  The
group, composed of the EU, the World Bank, the G-7 finance ministers, and
representatives of leading international organizations, is chaired by the EU and World
Bank. The EU and World Bank have also set up a European Agency for Reconstruction to
oversee reconstruction efforts.  It is located in Thessaloniki, Greece, with an “operations
center”in Pristina.  Alan Pearson of Australia serves as Special Representative Kouchner’s
deputy on reconstruction issues.
On July 28, 1999, an international donors conference was held in Brussels to discuss
Kosovo’s humanitarian and immediate reconstruction needs, and to secure funding
pledges.  The EU said that $2.167 billion was pledged at the conference.  The EU
estimates that $1.411 billion of the total is humanitarian aid, and $756.3 million is
reconstruction and other urgent program funding, although the distinction between the
two categories can be somewhat hazy.   Of the $2.167 billion, the European Union and its
member states pledged $1,138.7 billion and the United States $556.6 million.   Japan
pledged $160 million, and other countries pledged a total of $214 million.  The World
Bank pledged $60 million.  A follow-on conference was held on November 17, 1999 to
deal with long-term reconstruction projects.  The EU and the World Bank estimated that
Kosovo would need about $2.3 billion over the next 4-5 years, of which about $1.1 billion
would be needed for 1999-2000.  Total pledges at the conference amounted to just over
$1 billion.   Of this total, $759.3 million was pledged by the EU and EU member states. 
The United States pledged $156.6 million, and was the largest single country donor. 
According the World Bank and EU, as of June 30, 2000, over $1.5 billion had been
pledged, of which $1.17 billion had been committed to specific projects (76%) , and $553
million had been spent (36%).
Observers have offered mixed assessments of reconstruction aid so far.  International
aid and the efforts of ordinary Kosovars have resulted in progress in rebuilding housing
and other physical infrastructure, but economic reform efforts have lagged. Although
Kosovars have shown great resilience in setting up small businesses, uncertainty over
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Kosovo’s future status has created uncertainty over ownership rights, hindering plans for
the restructuring and privatization of much of the economy.
 Under the auspices of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, international
donors  held a conference on March 29-30, 2000 to pledge aid for regional reconstruction
projects.  About $2.4 billion was pledged for regional infrastructure and other projects. 
The United States pledged $77.65 million. (For more on the Kosovo reconstruction effort,
see the joint EU-World Bank site at [http://www.seerecon.org] and CRS Report
RL30453, Kosovo: Reconstruction and Development Assistance.  For more on the
Stability Pact, see the Stability Pact web site at [http://www.stabilitypact.org].) 
War Crimes 
On May 27, 1999, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY)  announced the indictment of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, Serbian
President Milan Milutinovic, FRY Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, Yugoslav
Army Chief of Staff Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs Vlajko
Stojiljkovic for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Yugoslav and
Serbian forces in Kosovo between January and May 1999. These include the expulsion of
approximately 740,000 ethnic Albanians from their homes and the murder of 340 persons
named in the indictment.   The indictments were the first issued by the Tribunal relating to
the Kosovo conflict.  Press reports say that the Tribunal also has a list of secret Kosovo
indictments.  Since the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, Tribunal
investigators, as well as other experts  have collected evidence at mass graves sites where
ethnic Albanian civilians were murdered. In September 1999, Tribunal prosecutor Carla
del Ponte said the main focus of the ICTY’s efforts will be the investigation and
prosecution of Milosevic and the other current indictees. In June 2000, UNMIK
announced that it would set up a Kosovo War and Ethnic Crimes Court to try ethnically-
based crimes, given the ICTY’s focus on high-level officials and the local courts inability
to take action.  It would be headed by international judges and prosecutors, but would
also include ethnic Serbs and Albanians. 
As of August 2000, ICTY investigators had found over 2,800 bodies in mass graves
in Kosovo.  Tribunal officials have stressed that the number found did not necessarily
represent the actual total number of bodies at those sites, since there was evidence that
some sites had been tampered with.  Moreover, Tribunal officials stress that they are not
attempting to find every atrocity victim in Kosovo, but are collecting evidence for
indictments and trials.  The true number of ethnic Albanians killed by Serb forces is not
precisely known.  A June 2000 report by the International Red Cross listed 3,368 missing
persons in Kosovo. Many observers believe most of those missing were killed during the
conflict.  According to a statistical study by the American Academy for the Advancement
of Science and other groups, about 10,500 Kosovar Albanians were killed by Serb forces
during the NATO air campaign.  Another statistical study by the Center for Disease
Control puts the number of Kosovar Albanian dead at about 12,000 for the entire war,
from February 1998 to June 1999.
On June 13, 2000, Del Ponte released a report that said that she would not indict
NATO officials for alleged war crimes during NATO’s air campaign.  The report said that
“although some mistakes were made by NATO, the Prosecutor is satisfied that there was
IB98041 01-10-01
CRS-12
no deliberate targeting of civilians or unlawful military targets by NATO during the
campaign.” On June 21, Del Ponte said her office was investigating possible KLA war
crimes and could bring charges against top KLA officials. After Milosevic’s fall from
power in October 2000, Tribunal officials demanded that the new leadership in Belgrade
turn him over to the Tribunal.   FRY Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic has said that the
FRY will establish a South Africa-style “truth commission” to uncover the facts about war
crimes in Kosovo.  He has also said that Milosevic could be tried for war crimes in
Belgrade in cooperation with the ICTY, but will not be transferred to Tribunal.  Del Ponte
continues to insist that Milosevic be transferred to ICTY for trial.   (For more on the
activities of the ICTY, see the ICTY website at [http://www.un.org/icty/index.html].)
U.S. Policy
From the beginning of the conflict in Kosovo, the Clinton Administration condemned
Serbian human rights abuses in Kosovo and called for autonomy for Kosovo within
Yugoslavia, while opposing independence.   The Administration pushed for air strikes
against Yugoslavia when Belgrade rejected the Rambouillet accords in March 1999, but
refused to consider the use of ground troops to eject Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. 
However, even before the air strikes, the Administration said that the U.S. troops would
participate in a Kosovo peace-keeping force, if a peace agreement were reached.  In a
nationally televised address on June 10, 1999, President Clinton hailed the withdrawal of
Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and the end of NATO air strikes as a “victory.” He added
the United States and its allies still faced challenges in Kosovo.  These included ensuring
that Yugoslavia completes the pullout of its troops from the province (which was
completed); the refugees return; the KLA demilitarizes; and the setting up of a UN civil
administration to rule the province until autonomous local institutions can be put in place. 
He said as these institutions take hold, NATO would be able to draw down its forces.
However, he warned that these efforts would be “dangerous,” and U.S. troops in KFOR
could suffer casualties. He said that the United States and the European Union must work
together to rebuild Kosovo and the region, but that “Europe must provide most of the
resources” for the effort.   (See also Kosovo: Lessons Learned from Operation Allied
Force, CRS Report RL30374.) 
President Clinton made his first visit to Kosovo on November 23, 1999.  He pledged
continued U.S. and international support for Kosovo but urged the Albanian community
to “win the peace” and to try to forgive the Serb population.  Secretary of State Albright
and National Security Advisor Berger, who accompanied President Clinton to Kosovo,
said that the international community had made good progress in bringing normality to
Kosovo, including improving the humanitarian situation and reducing the level of violence
in the province, but admitted that much work needed to be done.  
According to the Department of Defense Comptroller’s Office, DoD incremental
costs for Kosovo for FY 1999 were $3.0 billion.  This figure includes $1.78 billion for the
NATO air war, $1.05 billion for KFOR, $124.6 million in refugee aid, $34.6 million for
the OSCE observer mission before the war, and $20.3 million for the pre-war aerial
verification mission.  DoD incremental costs for Kosovo in FY2000 through the end of
July 2000 were $1.32 billion. The estimate for the whole of FY2000 is about $2 billion.  
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 In testimony before the House International Relations Committee on April 11, 2000,
James Pardew, a senior State Department official responsible for Kosovo policy, said that
the United States had allocated $6.384 billion for Kosovo for FY 1999 and FY2000,
including both military and civilian spending.  Of this total, $5.157 was for military costs
and $1.27 billion for civilian implementation costs (which include humanitarian aid,
reconstruction aid and U.N. and OSCE peacekeeping costs). He said that the United
States had allocated about 13.9% of the amount provided by all countries for Kosovo’s
reconstruction and about 20% of humanitarian aid.   He said the United States is paying
25% of U.N. peacekeeping costs in Kosovo and between 10-16% of OSCE costs.  He
also noted that the United States provides about 13% of the troops in KFOR.  The
Administration has opposed mandating a cap on the U.S. contribution to Kosovo aid at
15% of the total contributed by all countries, as well as efforts to mandate a termination
date or conditioning the continued deployment of U.S. military forces in Kosovo based on
disbursal targets for European aid to Kosovo.   Republican presidential candidate George
W. Bush also criticized the Kosovo amendments, calling them “legislative overreach” on
presidential powers.  
In a June 10, 2000 Washington Post article National Security Advisor Sandy Berger
said that progress in Kosovo since the end of the war was “significant, but incomplete.”
He said that UNMIK, KFOR and other international institutions had helped returning
ethnic Albanian refugees to their homes in Kosovo;  reduced crime, and started
reconstruction.  However, he said that crime rates remained far too high, violence against
ethnic Serbs continued, and that the judicial system in the province remained inadequate. 
He said that a key task for the coming year was to accelerate self-government in Kosovo
through elections and the development of government institutions.  He stated that
Kosovo’s status would be determined “eventually” through an international process that
would take into account not only the wishes of Kosovars, but also the international
community, adding that the emergence of a  post-Milosevic Serbia would be “key” to
solving the region’s problems. (Recent U.S. policy statements on Europe, including
Kosovo, can be found at [http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/eur/])
An October 21, 2000 New York Times article quoted Condoleezza Rice, a senior
foreign policy advisor to Republican Presidential candidate George W. Bush, as saying
that the United States should pull its ground forces out of the Balkans, including Kosovo,
at an unspecified date, leaving peacekeeping responsibilities to U.S. allies in Europe.  
Secretary of State-designate Colin Powell has indicated that the Bush Administration will
conduct an early review of U.S. participation in Balkans peacekeeping.
Congressional Response
In 1999, the 106th Congress debated whether U.S. and NATO air strikes in Kosovo
were in the U.S. national interest, and whether the President could undertake them
without congressional approval. In the end, Congress neither explicitly approved nor
blocked the air strikes, but appropriated funds for the air campaign and the U.S.
peacekeeping deployment in Kosovo after the fact.  (For information on the activities of
the 106th Congress during 1999, as well as more detail on its actions in 2000, see CRS
Report RL30729, Kosovo and the 106th Congress, November 6, 2000.) 
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In 2000, Members unsuccessfully attempted to condition the U.S. military
deployment in Kosovo on Congressional approval and on the implementation of aid
pledges made by European countries.  Many Members of Congress said that they expected
U.S. allies in Europe to contribute the lion’s share of aid to the region and expressed
concern that European countries were slow to implement their aid pledges.  Congress
moved to limit aid to Kosovo to 15% of the total amount pledged by all countries.  
On March 9, 2000, the House Appropriations Committee approved H.R. 3908, a
$9.1 billion FY2000 supplemental appropriations bill.  The bill included funds for a variety
of purposes, including Kosovo peacekeeping and  aid to the Balkans.   The committee
provided the full $2.025 billion requested by the President for DoD peacekeeping costs in
Kosovo.  However, the committee provided only $246.7 million of the $624.5 million
requested by the Administration for U.S. aid and diplomatic efforts in the Balkans.  It
rejected most of the administration’s request of $92.8 million in additional aid for Kosovo,
providing only $12.4 million in funding for American police in Kosovo.  The House
approved the bill on March 29 by a vote of 263-146.  The House rejected, by a vote of
219-200, an amendment offered by Rep. Kasich that would have withheld 50% of the
funds appropriated for U.S. military operations in Kosovo until the President certified that
European countries have obligated certain percentages of their aid pledges for 1999-2000
for Kosovo.  The Senate did not take up this bill. Congressional leaders ultimately decided
to attach Kosovo supplemental spending to the FY2001 military construction bill, P.L.
106-246. (For more on the bill, see CRS Report RL30457, Supplemental Appropriations
for FY2000: Plan Colombia, Kosovo, Foreign Debt Relief, Home Energy Assistance, and
Other Initiatives.)  
On May 18, 2000, the Senate approved S. 2521, the FY2001 military construction
appropriations bill by a vote of 96-4. The bill provided over $1.8 billion in FY2000
supplemental funding for DoD peacekeeping costs in Kosovo.  By a vote of 53-47, the
Senate voted to delete Section 2410 of the bill. The section would have cut off funding for
the deployment of U.S. ground troops in Kosovo after July 1, 2001, unless the President
requested and Congress approved a joint resolution specifically authorizing the
deployment.  It would also have withheld 25% of the FY2000 supplemental funding unless
the President certified that the Europeans had met certain targets for the obligation of
reconstruction, humanitarian aid, aid to the UNMIK budget and contributions to the
international police force in Kosovo. If the President did not provide this certification by
July 15, 2000, then funding could have only been used to withdraw U.S. ground troops
from Kosovo unless Congress adopted a joint resolution permitting their continued
deployment.  The final version of the law (P.L. 106-246) contained the full $2.025 billion
requested by the President for U.S. forces in Kosovo.  P.L. 106-246 also contained $50
million in aid to Croatia and Montenegro, and $12.5 million for police activities in
Kosovo.
On October 12, 2000, the House and Senate approved the conference version of 
H.R. 4205, the FY 2001 defense authorization bill.  Section 1005  limits FY 2001 military
funding for Kosovo to $1.65 billion, but permits the President to waive the provision if he
certifies the move is in the national security interest, provides a report on the deployment,
and submits a supplemental appropriations request.  Section 1211 requires the
Administration to submit by April 1 of each year a report on the impact of deployments in
the Balkans on U.S. military readiness.  Section 1212 requires the President to establish by
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May 31, 2001, “militarily significant benchmarks”  for a sustainable peace in Kosovo that
would ultimately allow U.S. troops to withdraw from the province. The section also
requires the President to develop “a comprehensive political-military strategy for the
Balkans and to provide semi-annual reports to Congress on its implementation. Section
1213 requires the President to submit on December 1, 2000 and every six months
thereafter, a detailed report on the contributions of European nations and organizations to
the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo as well as implementation of their aid pledges. The
conference dropped a provision in the House bill that would have prohibited funding for
the continued deployment of U.S. ground troops in Kosovo unless the President certified
that European countries had obligated specific percentages of their aid pledges for
Kosovo.  Section 1223 tasks the General Accounting Office with preparing a report on the
costs and benefits of U.S. military engagement in Europe, including Kosovo. The bill was
signed by the President on October 30, 2000 (P.L. 106-398.)
On October 25, 2000, the House and Senate approved H.R. 4811, the FY2001
foreign operations appropriations bill. The bill provides a total of $600 million  in aid to
central and eastern Europe in the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) account. 
The bill does not contain an earmark for Kosovo, but limits U.S. aid to 15% of the total
amount pledged by all donors for calendar year 2001 as of March 31, 2001.  It says that
$1.3 million “should” be made available for a National Albanian American Council training
program for Kosovar women. It bars funds from bill from being used for large-scale
physical infrastructure reconstruction. The bill was signed by the President on November
6, 2000 (P.L. 106-429).
In its first session, the 107th Congress will likely consider how much aid to provide
for Kosovo’s reconstruction and how the burden should be shared with European
countries. Another important issue will be continuing U.S. troop deployments in Kosovo
and elsewhere in the Balkans.  Members skeptical of what they view as open-ended U.S.
military deployments to the Balkans may attempt to set conditions, deadlines or other
restrictions on them.  These efforts may be boosted by similar skepticism expressed by 
incoming National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Secretary of State-designate
Colin Powell.   
IB98041 01-10-01
CRS-16
